

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY

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By HR-m/SG 6/23/91

April 24, 1959  
Walter Reed Hospital  
4:00 p. m.

Show:

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S/P  
date 5/12/57  
id. 4/28

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Participants:

Secretary Dulles  
Secretary Herter  
Mr. Dillon  
Mr. Murphy  
Mr. Merchant  
Mr. Greene

Not made  
in S/S

Secretary Dulles said he thought a difficult period lies ahead because it seems that the British have decided to go it alone and the period of intimate collaboration of 1957 and 1958 seems to be over. He expressed his views along the lines of the attached outline.

He speculated that during Macmillan's visit to Moscow, Khrushchev had planted the ideas that the United States may be trying to precipitate trouble, from which Britain would suffer most; that if the British would help the Soviet Government in the Berlin issue, this would be in the interests of Britain's safety; that trade prospects are good if Britain will take advantage of them with the Soviet Union; and that the Soviets might be able to help in the protection of British interests in Iraq and in countering Nasser. There probably had not been any written agreement, but rather a general impression on Macmillan.

In this situation, Secretary Dulles thought, the United States should assume a positive role of leadership with our own proposals, based on the concepts of NATO and the effective deterrent that our retaliatory power represents. If our allies now reject these concepts, then we may have to jolt them by some "agonizing reappraisal".

Secretary Herter recalled the points he had made to von Brentano on April 4, as being of a nature to impress on the Germans the importance of a clear and dependable policy. He went on to summarize the results

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S : J. N. Greene, Jr.

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of the Working Group's most recent efforts and the current status of our four-phased program, as well as the difficulties we are likely to have with it in discussion with our allies.

Secretary Dulles recalled his suggestion to the Vice President of a line the latter might take with Khrushchev during his visit to Moscow (see memorandum of April 20 to S/S). He thought that given the improbability of reaching an agreement with the Soviets, even if we can agree with our allies, we might consider how in the next few months to work against the background of showing up Berlin as a test of Soviet pretensions and professions.

Secretary Herter saw the Foreign Ministers meeting beginning on May 11, as a probing operation for us; hence we should not allow the conference to begin by a discussion of the Berlin issue. In response to Secretary Dulles' question, Secretary Herter said that it is not contemplated that any Senators join the U.S. delegation at least in the early stages; with this Senator Fulbright agrees. If events ever get to the point of signing an agreement with the Soviets, it might then be appropriate to include some Senators on the U.S. delegation.

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Joseph N. Greene, Jr.

Attachment:  
Outline.

S:JNGreene, Jr.:jm

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#1 April 21, 1959

BRITISH AND UNITED STATES VIEWS ON DEALING WITH THE SOVIET UNION

I. Differences in Philosophy and Approach

A. The British view:

- "Russian problem" today same as in 19th century
- Expansionist goals of Soviet Government akin to those of Tsarist Governments, and hence susceptible of limitation by negotiated deals;
- Hence dependable agreements relieving tension and limiting expansion of Communism are attainable and should be sought.

B. The United States view:

- "Russian problem" today is that International Communism uses Soviet Government as its tool
- Expansion of International Communism is article of faith not susceptible of limitation by negotiation;

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- it can only be limited by denying it opportunities  
and successes, where necessary by the will to use  
superior force; and by the dynamic faith of the democracies
- Soviet Government does not negotiate in good faith; it uses  
negotiation as a tactic to achieve, or screen to hide, its  
true objectives;  
hence dependable agreements are unattainable except  
as they can be based on the premise that violation would  
be more costly to the Soviets than observance.

## II. Current Ramifications

### A. A crisis of confidence?

- Macmillan and his Government not forthcoming with us  
since about January 1.
- Have not been candid about talks with Khrushchev; viz  
message to Secretary prior to trip.

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- Were not candid during Secretary's visit to London in February.

- Possible "spheres of influence" deal, affecting Middle East and Europe.

B. Factors in the United Kingdom

Economic - Importance of Middle East; jealousy of United

States relations with West Germany and Japan;

opposition to continental integration;

- Greers Ferry Turbine case

pre-election politics play minor role in UK attitudes.

C. Factors in the United States

- Ours is the "king-pin" of power; therefore our views are in the last analysis compelling on the UK and our other allies.

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